Channel and question
- Input
- \(X\in\mathbb R\) with average power \(P\).
- Output
- \(Y=X+N_1\) and \(Z=X+N_2\).
- Law
- Gaussian noise variances satisfy \(\sigma_1^2<\sigma_2^2\).
- Quantity
- Secrecy capacity \(C_s\), measured in secret bits per channel use.
Criterion. Reliable communication with vanishing leakage.
- The eavesdropper channel is degraded.
- Weak or strong secrecy gives the same asymptotic value under standard formulations.
Current status
| Result | Relation | Method | Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lower | \(C_s\ge C(\sigma_1^2)-C(\sigma_2^2)\) | Gaussian stochastic encoding and binning. | 1978 |
| Upper | \(C_s\le C(\sigma_1^2)-C(\sigma_2^2)\) | Degraded secrecy converse and Gaussian extremality. | 1978 |
Lean formalization
Version 1 · Lean. A future continuous secrecy layer should share definitions with the discrete wiretap channel.
No external Lean proof is registered. Proofs longer than roughly 50 lines or requiring problem-specific infrastructure should live in a dedicated repository and link back to this statement version.
References
- S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and Martin E. Hellman (1978). The Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. DOI 10.1109/TIT.1978.1055917.
Discussion
Thread key: capacityatlas:gaussian-wiretap-channel